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CORROBORATION OF CONFESSIONS IN
FEDERAL AND MILITARY TRIALS
GILBERT G. ACKROYDt
THE BACKGROUND
N ENGLAND AND OTHER PARTS of the British Common-
wealth which follow the course of the common law, no actual rule
of law appears to have been developed which requires that confessions
in criminal cases be corroborated in order to merit consideration by
the jury in deciding the question of guilt or innocence. Instead, a rule
of practice seems to have evolved in the beginning of the nineteenth
century indicated by a number of cases in which it was judicially men-
tioned that an accused "ought" not to be convicted merely on the basis
of his confession. This probably was an outgrowth of the feeling
prevalent among common law judges in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries that confessions were a weak form of proof in any
event, subject to suspicions of foul play and to a number of economic
and sociological pressures many of which were inherent in the social
and legal systems of those times. Normally, these expressed judicial
desires for corroborative proof, or, rather, for additional proof often
amounting to physical or even visible evidence of the crime, were
voiced from the bench only in homicide cases, but reliance upon con-
fessions was limited and sometimes flatly refused in other cases as well.'
Wigmore, in his work on Evidence, suggests that the policy
behind any rule requiring corroboration may be lacking in validity
in what we like to describe as a more enlightened age, but there are
those who would disagree with him. In fact, a majority of American
courts feel that some rule of corroboration is required,' for although
social and legal systems have changed considerably between the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, various pressures, particularly psycho-
logical and often undisclosed, upon an accused person to confess are
still frequently present even if they do exist in a different and some-
t Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps, Chief, Military Justice Division,
Office of The Judge Advocate General, United States Army; LL.B. 1936, LL.M.
1937, Boston University. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of The Judge Ad-
vocate General or any other governmental agency.
1. 3 Wirmoi, EVIDENCE §§ 865-866 (3d ed. 1940) ; 7 WIGMORU, EVIDENcZ§§ 2070-2071 (3d ed. 1940) ; See, 10 Halsbury's Laws of England, 438, 439, 469 (3d ed.
1955).
2. 7 WIGMORU, op. cit. supra, Note 1, §§ 2070-2071.
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times more sophisticated form. Indeed, it may be that the refinements
of present day life and procedures have actually accentuated the
problems in this field. In his travels, the author has noted that con-
tinental free European judges, like their American counter-parts, are
also somewhat loath to put much trust in uncorroborated confessions,
although in the continental systems, as in the British system, crystallized
rules are often lacking in this respect.
In the United States, a positive rule of law requiring corrobora-
tion of confessions early made its appearance, apparently as a result of
Greenleaf's writing on evidence and the work of other text writers. The
rule took two forms: one, holding that the corroboration might be of any
sort so long as it in fact supported the truthfulness of the confession,
and the other, the majority rule, which had its genesis in the early Eng-
lish practice, requiring that the corroboration must specifically show a
probability that the offense, the corpus delicti, had really been com-
mitted by someone, not necessarily the accused. 3
The most celebrated early federal decision on the subject was
the opinion of the late Judge Learned Hand in the case of Daeche v.
United States,4 decided in 1918. In that case, Judge Hand, in one part
of his opinion, said, "The corroboration must touch the corpus delicti in
the sense of the injury against whose occurrence the law is directed."'
In a later part of the opinion, however, Judge Hand said, " . . . any
corroborating circumstances will serve which in the judges' opinion go
to fortify the truth of the confession. Independently, they need not
establish the truth of the corpus delicti at all, neither beyond a reason-
able doubt nor by a preponderance of proof."6 The opinion went on to
indicate that the judge need not charge the jury on the subject of
corroboration, for this was a matter for him to decide.
It can be seen that the first statement concerning corroboration
seemed to follow the corpus delicti rule, whereas the second statement
could be read as giving adherence to the rule requiring merely that
the confession be corroborated. Consequently, the case caused much
confusion through the years, and many courts quoted the first state-
ment without referring at all to the second, or the second without
mentioning the first. However, both the habit of careless interpreta-
tion of the Daeche opinion and Wigmore's suggestion that no rule of
corroboration was necessary in the twentieth century were sharply
taken to task in the case of Forte v. United States,7 a District of
3. 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, Note 1, § 2071.
4. 250 Fed. 566 (2d Cir. 1918).
5. Id. at 571.
6. Ibid. (emphasis supplied).
7. 94 F.2d 236 (App. D.C. 1937).
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Columbia Court of Appeals case decided in 1937. Said the Court of
Appeals:
For this premise [that there is even now a real danger of
false confessions, coerced or psychopathic] there seems now, what-
ever may have been the state of that data in 1923, the date of
Mr. Wigmore's work [2nd Ed.], substantial foundation not only
in the annals of the courts in the sense of the reported decisions
thereof, but also in dependable reports of criminological in-
vestigations.'
The court went on to say, after pointing out the frequent misquotations
from, and misinterpretations of, the Daeche case:
' * * there can be no conviction of an accused in a criminal
case upon an uncorroborated confession, and [following what
was described as the "better view" in the Federal courts] such
corroboration is not sufficient if it tends merely to support the
confession without also embracing substantial evidence of the
corpus delicti ad the whole thereof. We do not rule that such cor-
roborating evidence must, independent of the confession, establish
the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. It is sufficient ... if,
there being, independent of the confession, substantial evidence
of the corpus delicti and the whole thereof, this evidence and the
confession are together convincing beyond a reasonable doubt of
the commission of the crime and the defendant's connection there-
with.9
The conviction was reversed because there was no independent evi-
dence of the scienter-knowing that the stolen vehicle alleged to have
been transported in interstate commerce was in fact stolen. The court
also pointed out that although the corpus delicti rule does not properly
require independent evidence of the agency of the accused as a criminal,
there are certain crimes involving scienter in which it is impossible to
separate the scienter and the agency of the accused.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL PROVISIONS
It was against the above background that the rules governing
corroboration of confessions appearing in the various Manuals for
Courts-Martial were drafted. In the 1917 Manual,1" the following
statement appears, which was either written or largely influenced by
Wigmore:
[There must be] some proof of the fact that the crime
charged has probably been committed by some one so that there
8. Id. at 238.
9. Id. at 240 (emphasis supplied).
10. Para. 22 5 (a).
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will be some corroboration of the confession. It is not requisite
that this outside evidence constituting proof of the corpus delicti
shall be sufficient to convince the court beyond a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused, nor need it cover every element con-
tained in the charge. For instance, where desertion is charged
proof of absence without leave would be considered as proving
the corpus delicti . . . and in cases of larceny and selling clothing,
the fact that the property alleged to have been stolen or sold was
missing is sufficient proof.
Obviously, this is the corpus delicti rule, but it constitutes only a half-
way compliance with the rule. For example, the corpus delicti in
desertion is not only absence without leave, but is absence without
leave plus an intent to remain away permanently.
The rule in the 1921 Manual" remained substantially the same
as the rule in the 1917 Manual, but apparently the drafters of the 1928
Manual had some doubts about the omissions in the rule as announced
in previous Manuals. Although the rule in the 1928 Manual1 2 retained
the statement that the outside evidence need not cover every element
in the charge, the desertion example was omitted and a significant
change was made in the examples concerning larceny and unlawful
sale. These examples now required a showing that the property was
missing under circumstances indicating that it was probably stolen or
probably unlawfully sold.
Although the 1949 Manual"3 contained in effect the confusing and
inconsistent language of the 1928 Manual, the 1951 Manual1 4 omitted
the statement that the evidence of the corpus delicti need not cover
every element in the charge. In 1953, in the case of United States v.
Isenberg,15 the Court of Military Appeals took notice of this change
and came to the conclusion that it was the intent of the drafters of the
1951 Manual to adopt the rule of corroboration requiring full evidence
of the corpus delicti, "and the whole thereof," as set forth in the Forte
case. The Isenberg case is interesting in view of the provisions of
earlier Manuals, for the offense was desertion and the only proof of
the corpus delicti was absence without leave. The Court of Military
Appeals held that this was not enough and that there would also have
to be independent evidence of the intent to remain away permanently
to support a conviction of desertion. And in United States v. Mires,"6
the Court of Military Appeals pointed out that the rule that evidence
11. Para. 225(c).
12. Para. 114.
13. Para. 127a.
14. Para. 140a.
15. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 349, 8 C.M.R. 149 (1953).
16. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 316, 24 C.M.R. 126 (1957).
FALL 1962]
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of the corpus delicti need only show that the offense charged was
probably committed by someone is not a rule to be blindly followed
in every case, stating that: " . . . when the specification alleges use of
narcotics that someone must, of necessity, be the accused.""7
Thus it can be seen that the rule of the Forte case, at the moment
at least, appears to be the rule of corroboration followed in the military.
One question remains unresolved, however, and that is whether the
law officer-the military trial judge-should charge the fact finding
members of the court with respect to the rule requiring corroboration
and require them to find in the course of considering their verdict
whether or not the corroborative evidence is to be believed. Although
the matter was raised by the defense before the Court of Military
Appeals in United States v. Landrum,"' the court refused to decide
the point, there being other fatal error in the case. In passing, how-
ever, Chief Judge Quinn noted that a number of State and Federal
courts have held that when the evidence of the corpus delicti is not
substantial, the trial judge must instruct the jury that it must find a
probability of the commission of the offense from the independent evi-
dence before it can consider the accused's pre-trial statements. The
late Judge Brosman, however, asserted that he thought that the ques-
tion of corpus delicti was solely for the trial judge and not for the
jury. Judge Brosman's position seems somewhat inconsistent with
the stand taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in Weiler
v. United States, 9 in which it was held that the question of corrobora-
tion in a perjury case where only one witness sustained the charge
should go to the jury.
Prior to the Uniform Code and the 1951 Manual for Courts-
Martial, the Naval rule as expressed in Naval Courts and Boards2"
left one to wonder whether the corpus delicti rule or the mere corrobora-
tion rule applied in the Navy. The Naval provision read:
It [the confession] must be corroborated by independent
evidence. This evidence, however, need not be such as alone to
establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, it is suffi-
cient if, when considered in connection with the confession, it
satisfies the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was
committed and that the accused committed it.
Thus far it could be said that the intent was to adopt the corroboration
rule, but the next sentence seems to infer that the corpus delicti rule
was meant. It reads:
17. Id. at 318, 24 C.M.R. 128 (1957).
18. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 707, 16 C.M.R. 281 (1954).
19. 323 U.S. 606 (1944), Accord, United States v. Crooks, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 677,
31 C.M.R. 263 (1962).
20. § 176.
[VOL. 8: p. 64
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That the evidence of the corpus delicti should be introduced
before the confession is good practice, but the court in its discre-
tion may determine the order of evidence.
Whatever rule was formerly used in practice in the Navy is only of
historical interest now, for all services are presently governed by the
Uniform Code, the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial, and the decisions
of the Court of Military Appeals.
THE OPPER AND SMITH CASES
In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
case of Opper v. United States.2 The petitioner had been convicted of
conspiring with and inducing a federal employee to accept outside
compensation for services rendered in a matter before a federal agency.
Petitioner claimed that the independent evidence was insufficient to
corroborate certain admissions made by him which had been intro-
duced by the Government at the trial. The Court, after first determin-
ing that admissions as well as confessions required corroboration if
they are to be used to support a conviction against the accused (this
is also the military rule12), and after discussing the Daeche and Forte
cases, stated :
However, we think the better rule to be that the corrobora-
tive evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the state-
ments, to establish the corpus delicti. It is necessary, therefore, to
require the Government to introduce substantial independent evi-
dence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the
statement. Thtus the independent evidence serves a dual function.
It tends to make the admission reliable, thus corroborating it
while also establishing independently the other necessary elements
of the offense. . . . It is sufficient if the corroboration supports
the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference
of their truth. Those facts plus the other evidence besides the
admission must, of course, be sufficient to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.23
The case of Smith v. United States24 was decided on the same day as
the Opper case. This was an income tax evasion case in which the
Government had proved its case by the net worth method plus certain
extrajudicial statements of the petitioner. The defense had contended
that these statements had not been sufficiently corroborated. The Court,
after pointing out that in a crime such as tax evasion there is no
21. 348 U.S. 84 (1954). Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result. Mr.
Justice Douglas believed the Forte case stated the better rule on corroboration.
22. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, para. 14a.
23. 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954) (emphasis supplied).
24. 348 U.S. 147 (1954). This was a unanimous opinion.
FALL 1962]
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tangible injury which can be isolated as a corpus delicti, a crime com-
itted merely by someone, and that in such offenses the corroborative
evidence must implicate the accused in order to show that the crime
had been committed (a distinction not mentioned in Opper), laid down
the following rule:
In addition to differing views on the substantiality of specific
independent evidence, the debate [concerning the type and content
of corroboration] has centered largely about two questions: (1)
whether corroboration is necessary for all elements of the offense
established by admissions alone . . . and (2) whether it is suffi-
cient if the corroboration merely fortifies the truth of the confes-
sion, without independently establishing the crime charged ....
We answer both questions in the affirmative. All elements of the
offense must be established by independent evidence or cor-
roborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is
for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and
thereby prove the offense "through" the statements of the accused.2"
As in the Opper case, the Court found in the Smith case also that the
Government had met its burden of corroboration.
The Opper and Smith cases plainly indicate that the Supreme
Court of the United States has cast aside the corpus delicti rule in
favor of the corroboration only rule, but the two cases considered
together provide a much more lucid enunciation of that rule than here-
tofore has been available. In essence, the rule seems to be that for each
element or requirement of proof of the offense which the Government
intends to establish primarily through a confession or admission of
the accused, it must provide independent corroborative evidence
sufficient to raise a jury inference of the truth oc the portion of the
confession or admission relied upon. Note carefully the term "jury
inference." This would seem to require an instruction to the jury on
the matter in accordance with the principles laid down in the Weiler
case.26 However, this point was not raised by a request for instruc-
tions or otherwise in either of the cases, and the Court did not men-
tion the matter. As might be expected, the Opper and Smith cases
have been followed by the United States Courts of Appeals. They
have not been followed, however, by the United States Court of Mili-
tary Appeals,2" although Chief Judge Quinn prefers the Opper and
25. Id. at 156.
26. Supra, note 19.
27. See, for example, Herman v. United States, 220 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1955);
Braswell v. United States, 224 F.2d 706 (10th Cir. 1955) ; French v. United States,
232 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1956). But see, Cutchlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 295
(9th Cir. 1962).
28. United States v. Villasenor, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 19 C.M.R. 129 (1955);
United States v. Mims, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 316, 24 C.M.R. 126 (1957) ; United States
v. McFerrin, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 28 C.M.R. 255 (1959).
[VOL. 8: p. 64
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Smith rule. Judge Ferguson bases his adherence to the corpus delicti
rule on the ground that he believes it to be the better rule for the
military, and former Judge Latimer based his adherence on the ground
that he felt himself bound by the Manual for Courts-Martial.
OPPER AND SMITH RULE PREFERABLE
The author personally believes that the corpus delicti rule, as
found in the Manual and as followed by the Court of Military Appeals
at the moment at least, is in essence an artificial rule which could now
be quite safely abandoned in view of the guidance furnished by the
Opper and Smith cases. The corpus delicti rule has been found want-
ing whenever any complicated or difficult application of its principles
is demanded. For example, we have seen that at least one of its
precepts-that independent proof is required to indicate only that some-
one, not necessarily the accused, has probably committed the crime-
cannot be applied in quite a large category of cases. Furthermore, only
incidentally does it have anything to do with corroboration of the con-
fession or admission, which after all is supposed to be its principal
justification for existence. There are no clear, or even reasonably
acceptable, standards for its application when one seriously tries to
determine what the components of a probability that a crime has been
committed really are, as distinguished from a possibility or proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Opper and Smith rule, on the other
hand, contains a clear, workable formula which can easily be applied
by either judge or jury-independent evidence sufficient to raise an
inference of the truth of the confession or admission. It is submitted
that the object of this rule is the only justification for any rule of
corroboration, for apart from questions of voluntariness of confessions
or admissions, the only permissible test of their exclusion or admission
should be their trustworthiness and this is a problem which should be
attacked directly, as it is in Opper and Smith, and not obliquely as is
the case under the corpus delicti rule.
CORROBORATING EVIDENCE
It would be a fruitless task indeed to attempt to catalogue the
various types of evidence or factual situations which might or might
not be sufficient to corroborate a confession or admission of the accused
under either the Forte or the Smith and Opper rule, for both rules
lay down only broad juristic l)rinciples which, of course, must be
applied on a case by case basis. There is, however, at least one area in
the field of sufficiency of corroboration that merits discussion on the
FALL 1962]
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plane of legal theory, and that is the question whether a confession or
admission can be corroborated by other evidence of a type which in
turn requires corroboration under its own rule of corroboration.
In United States v. Mounts,2" the Court of Military Appeals, in
reversing the accused's conviction of a sex offense, held that an out of
court utterance of the child victim's twin brother, which described the
offense and was claimed to have been made by the brother while he
was still in a state of excitement as a result of having observed the
event, had erroneously been admitted in evidence under the spontaneous
exclamation exception to the hearsay rule because no evidence "inde-
pendent" of the exclamation had been introduced which tended to show
that the shocking event had actually occurred. This independent cor-
roborative evidence, seemingly, would have to amount to something
more than the mere apparent mental perturbation of the declarant at
the time the statement was made. The holding of the court, although
partially based on an interpretation of some of Dean Wigmore's lan-
guage in discussing the spontaneous exclamation rule, was principally
bottomed on a similar decision of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Brown v. United States.30 However, in the Brown case
there was no confession by the accused, whereas in the Mounts case the
accused had confessed and this confession had been admitted in evi-
dence at the trial. This difference in the two cases was rather swiftly
passed over by the court, without case or other citation, with the
statement: " . . . the record is totally devoid of other evidence of the
shocking event essential to admissibility-apart from . .. the confes-
sion of the accused, the acceptance of which hinges on the establish-
ment of the corpus delicti." '3' The court then declared that both the
spontaneous exclamation and the confession were inadmissible for lack
of corroboration.
In United States v. Anderson, 2 the Court of Military Appeals
again held invalid a sex offense conviction on the ground that the
only evidence of the crime, aside from the accused's confession, was
an "uncorroborated" spontaneous exclamation of the child victim. In
addition to the Brown case, the court relied upon a later decision of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of Jones
29. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 114, 2 C.M.R. 20. The Court held that the statement of the
brother was also inadmissible on the ground that the record "was unclear" as to
whether the statement was actually based on personal knowledge. The victim's own
out-of-court statement was held inadmissible principally on the ground that it was
calm and deliberative and not spontaneous. The confession having been held
inadmissible as well, and there being no other evidence, the conviction was reversed.
30. 152 F.2d 138 (App. D.C. 1945).
31. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 114 at 121, 2 C.M.R. 20 at 27.
32. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 200, 27 C.M.R. 274.
[VOL. 8: p. 64
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v. United States.3 3 An examination of this decision, however, reveals
that in this case also no confession of the accused had been introduced
in evidence. In Anderson, the court stated that the appellate Govern-
ment (Navy) counsel had "conceded" that the confession should be
considered to be uncorroborated if the spontaneous exclamation was
held inadmissible. Chief Judge Quinn dissented on the ground that he
thought there was independent evidence of the spontaneous exclama-
tion apart from the confession.
One might ask if the federal courts would adopt the same attitude
as the Court of Military Appeals concerning the question as to whether
a confession could corroborate a spontaneous exclamation and the
exclamation could in turn corroborate the confession, thus making
both admissible. It is doubtful that the federal courts would follow
the Court of Military Appeals in this regard. In Fountain v. United
States, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had before
it a case in which the accused had been convicted of an assault with
intent to commit rape upon a female child but had been acquitted of
a charge of taking indecent liberties with the same child. The accused,
in his "confession," had admitted the indecent liberties but had denied
the assault with intent to commit rape. The child's spontaneous ex-
clamation, introduced in evidence through the testimony of adults since
it was ruled that she was incompetent to testify, was corroborated only
to the extent of the facts admitted in the confession, for there was no
medical testimony, no physical markings, and apparently no eyewit-
nesses. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction of assault with
intent to commit rape, for as to this crime there was no confession to
corroborate and the spontaneous exclamation as to assault with intent
to commit rape was itself uncorroborated. With respect to the in-
decent liberties charge, however, the court, in what must be considered
dicta in view of the accused's acquittal, held that a conviction of in-
decent liberties would have been proper and said:
Absent some such proof [medical testimony or physical
markings] in this case, the confession, taken separately, fails to
establish a carnal knowledge case for it deals with an exciting act
which rendered the child's statements of evidentiary value only
as to the indecent liberties count.35
There would seem to be no reason from any legal, ethical, or
psychological standpoint why a voluntary confession of an accused
should not be sufficient to corroborate an apparently spontaneous ex-
33. 231 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
34. 236 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
35. Id. at 686 (final emphasis added).
FALL 1962]
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clamation made by another, and vice versa, when both statements
relate to the same offense. When a confession is shown to be volun-
tary, the only logical purpose in requiring corroboration, under any of
the rules of corroboration, is to allay suspicions that the inculpatory
statement might have been untruthful due to factors operating upon
the personality of the defendant other than outside force or persuasion.
In other words, a voluntary or even pathological untruthfulness must
be the principal concern here. Also, when determining whether a
"spontaneous" exclamation is admissible, the primary object of the in-
quiry is whether the exclamation is in fact spontaneous-is in fact the
result of an exciting event-for it is this very element which is the
oath substitute and which thus makes the exclamation admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule. It is at once obvious that the con-
fession is "other," "outside," or "independent" evidence of the exciting
event with respect to the spontaneous exclamation, and that the latter
exists quite independently and apart from the confession. Indeed, the
two pieces of evidence spring from different sources, persons, and im-
pulses. Parenthetically, speaking merely of the matter of order of
proof, it should here be noted that a confession is not inadmissible
because uncorroborated at the time it is offered, for the law requires
only that it may not be considered by the jury in deciding the issue of
guilt or innocence unless it stands corroborated after all the evidence
is in.36 Consequently, apart from a somewhat mechanical application
of supposed "rules," the only possible rationale for denying corrobora-
tive force on a mutual basis to both the confession and the spontaneous
exclamation would be some fear that there might be collusion between
the makers of the two statements, an event most unlikely to happen
considering the fact that in the ordinary case the parties will represent
completely opposing interests. The coincidence of the two statements,
springing from separate sources but both telling the same tale, should
effectively dispel any qualms of possible fabrication."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the author is of the opinion that, whatever rule of
corroboration might be used in considering the admissibility of in-
culpatory statements of an accused person, the reason for the rule
36. 7 WIGMORn, EvIDENC9 § 2073 (3d ed. 1940).
37. In United States v. Knight, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 229, 30 C.M.R. 229 (1961),
the author, then Chief of the Army's Government Appellate Division, invited the
Court to overrule its earlier decisions denying mutual corroborative force to con-
fessions and spontaneous exclamations. However, since the decision in favor of the
Government was on another ground - that the corroborative evidence of a
spontaneous exclamation need only relate to an exciting event and not necessarily to
the precise event charged - the question of mutual corroboration was not mentioned
in the opinion, except perhaps inferentially in Judge Ferguson's dissent.
[VOL. 8: p. 64
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being employed must be kept in proper perspective in relation to the
facts-and all the facts-of the case at bar. It would appear that the
rule has no legitimate purpose other than affording to accused persons
a protection from being convicted of confessed crimes which they have
not committed or which have not been committed at all. The rule
should not be permitted to become a breeding ground of undue legalism,
nor should it be elevated to the position of occupying a high place in
the norms of our free society, as has happened in the case of the right
against self-incrimination and other rules springing from constitutional
sources which are often applied, and perhaps not improperly so, for
reasons of policy having little to do with justice in the particular case.
With respect to the general problem of corroboration of confessions,
the Opper and Smith cases have certainly provided an enlightened
approach, but as has been indicated in various places in this paper a
considerable amount of tidying up remains to be done in this field.
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